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Introduction  
  The demand for auditing arises from the auditor’s monitoring role in the 
principal-agent relationship (Eilifsen and Messier, 2000; Salehi and Nanjegowda, 
2006; Salehi, 2007). According to agency theory, an agency relationship is a 
contract under which one or more principals engage an agent to perform some 
service on the principals’ behalf and delegate some decision-making authority to 
the agent (Jenson and Meckling, 1976). When there are conflicts between the 
interests of the principal and the agent, the agent may not act in the best of interests 
of the principal. In order to avoid or minimize such divergences from his or her 
interests, the principal can establish monitoring systems (Barzegar and Salehi, 
2008). The financial statement audit is a monitoring mechanism that helps reduce 
information asymmetry and protect the interests of the principals, specifically, 
stockholders and potential stockholders, by providing reasonable assurance that 
management’s financial statements are free from material misstatements (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986; Salehi, 2008). 
Abstract 
This study investigates the effect of audit quality on accrual reliability of 
listed companies on Tehran Stock Exchange. In order to determine audit quality has 
been used of two criteria of auditor level and auditor commission period and due to 
calculate accrual reliability in following of Richardson et al., (2005) model and of 
stability of accrual. The study covers 74 listed companies on Tehran Stock Exchange 
during 2005-2009 periods. Also, multiple linear regression models and data 
investigation method have been used sectional and annual investigation to test 
research hypotheses. Research findings indicate that audited firms with higher audit 
quality as compared by audited firms with lower quality have more accrual stability 
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  The performance quality of this monitoring function may vary. Audit 
quality describes how well an audit detects and reports material misstatements of 
financial statements, reduces information asymmetry between management and 
stockholders and therefore helps protect the interests of stockholders (Salehi and 
Azary, 2008). High audit quality should be associated with high information 
quality of financial statements because financial statements audited by high quality 
auditors should be less likely to contain material misstatements (Salehi and 
Abedini, 2008). Reaching to this desired purpose is completely depended on audit 
institution properties and these properties can be related to audit quality in positive 
or negative. 
  According to Titman and Truman (1986), more qualitative audit improves 
precision of purposed information and allows to investors to obtain more accurate 
estimation of company value (Chambers & Payne, 2008 b). With respect to various 
purposed definitions of audit quality, audit quality frame can be presented such that: 
audit quality includes beauty fame of auditor and professional care of auditor, so 
subsequently beauty fame of auditor, authenticity of financial reports will be 
increased and as a result of monitoring and professional care of audit, the quality of 
financial reports will be increased (Salehi, Mansoury, and Pirayesh, 2008). The 
most important index of measuring auditor beauty fame is auditor size which these 
two have direct relation to each other as larger the auditor size, audit quality will be 
higher. One of the index of auditor professional care measurement and his 
supervision ability is auditor tenure. 
  Longer the auditor commission period, his knowledge of client and his 
specialty in particular industry will be increased and cause to increasing quality of 
audit. 
  In other hand, in realistic world, pecuniary receipt and payment occur in 
periods which are different from occurrence time of transactions and their father 
events and the same affair causes that use of accrual (same assumption of 
warranted accounting) for measuring performance results of commercial unit 
become well than pure measure of cash receipts. 
  However, problem is that accruals unlike crash items are accompanied 
with a degree of ambiguity which is resulting in their reliability reduction. 
Regarding to problem of benefits' confliction between ownership and management, 
purposed accruals can be manipulated by managers in financial reports and their 
reliability may be come to question. In respect to purposed problems above, the 
question which is made is that how can support investors against financial reports 
accrual manipulation. 
  One of the effective methods to control accrual manipulation by 
management and viewpoint applying for selecting accounting procedures is 
accounting process. 
  Now regarding to auditors control role and attest and existence of audit 
different size in one hand, existence of objectives and different problems in 
provision and presentation of information and financial reports by management in 
other hand, a problem which this study attempts to response it includes that what 
differences are there between accrual reliability of listed companies with higher 
audit quality compared with audited firms with lower audit quality?    Volume 11, Issue 5, December 2010           Review of International Comparative Management  942 
  Audit Quality: definition 
 
  One common definition of audit quality is provided by De Angelo (1981). 
She defines audit quality as “the market-assessed joint probability that a given 
auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting system, and   
(b) report the breach.” The probability that the auditor will report the detected 
misstatements is defined by De Angelo (1981) as auditor independence. Therefore, 
according to De Anglo’s (1981) definition, audit quality is an increasing function 
of an auditor’s ability to detect accounting misstatements and auditor independence 
as assessed by the market. De Angelo’s (1981) definition refers to “market-
assessed” or perceived audit quality. When applying this definition to actual audit 
quality, there is an underlying assumption that market perceived audit quality 
reflects actual audit quality. However, many studies (e.g., Krishnan, 2002) adopt 
this definition without addressing the distinction between these two different 
concepts. 
  Palmrose (1988) defines audit quality in terms of level of assurance. Since 
the purpose of an audit is to provide assurance on financial statements, audit 
quality is the probability that financial statements contain no material 
misstatements. In fact, this definition uses the results of the audit, that is, reliability 
of audited financial statements to reflect audit quality. This definition leads to the 
following question: “How do financial statement users assess the level of assurance 
and reliability of audited financial statements?” This is a post hoc audit quality 
definition because the assurance level cannot be assessed until the audit has been 
conducted. As a result, Palmrose’s definition refers to actual audit quality. 
  Other researchers also have suggested definitions for audit quality. For 
example, Titman and Trueman (1986) define auditor quality in terms of the 
accuracy of information the auditor supplies to investors. Their definition is similar 
to the one provided by Palmrose (1988). Davidson and Neu (1993) provide an 
audit quality definition that is based on the auditor’s ability to detect and eliminate 
material misstatements and manipulations in reported net income. Lam and Chang 
(1994) suggest that audit quality should be defined on an engagement-by-
engagement rather than on a firm basis. 
  However, whether this size proxy captures both perceived audit quality and 
actual audit quality is unclear. Perceived audit quality is based on perceptions of 
financial statement users, while actual audit quality refers to the auditor’s ability to 
detect and report accounting misstatements. Financial statement users lack access 
to the evidence gathered during the audit process and to the information audited, 
and thus cannot assess actual audit quality directly. Further, prior research has not 
clearly distinguished these concepts. DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the 
market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both detect material 
misstatements in the client’s financial statements and report the material 
misstatements. This is a definition of perceived audit quality since DeAngelo 
(1981) emphasizes the role of the market in assessing audit quality. The 
willingness to report discovered material misstatements is defined by DeAngelo 
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definition, audit quality is a function of the auditor’s ability to detect material 
misstatements (auditor competence) and auditor independence. 
  Since actual audit quality is unobservable before and when an audit is 
performed, a valid proxy is needed when investigating the relationships between 
actual audit quality and other factors. DeAngelo (1981) analytically demonstrates 
that auditor size has a positive relationship with audit quality, since a large audit 
firm has “more to lose” by failing to report a discovered material misstatement in a 
client’s records. Following DeAngelo’s study, many other studies empirically 
examine the relationship between auditor size and audit quality (e.g., Krishnan and 
Schauer, 2000; and Palmrose, 1988). Teoh and Wong (1993) test this relationship 
using earnings response coefficients to measure audit quality. However, the proxy 
used in Teoh and Wong’s (1993) study may capture only perceived audit quality, 
an auditor’s actual ability to detect and report accounting misstatements. Because 
actual audit quality is unobservable when audit service is provided, and some 
period of time must elapse before audit failures become apparent, it might be 
expedient for researchers to use a perceived audit quality measure. However, if 
perceived audit quality does not reflect actual audit quality, using financial 
statement users’ perceived audit quality to test the relationship among audit quality 
and other variables is problematic. Financial statement users may not be able to 
assess actual audit quality accurately because they do not have access to the audit 
process. This study provides some insights in evaluating actual audit quality and 
the validity of the size proxy for audit quality in certain circumstances. 
  To measure audit quality, different indices such as auditor size, auditor 
tenure, and specialty in auditor industry, auditor authenticity risk and client legal 
claims, auditor independency and so on were presented and used to researchers. 
Regarding to importance of these indices in one hand, and also existence of some 
limitations to select suitable indices in the other hand (For instance, non-
transparency of information about audit fees), in this research has employed two 
indices of auditor level and auditor tenure to measure audit quality (Salehi and 
Rostami, 2009). 
  The most important index of auditor beauty fame is size of audit institution. 
Larger audit institutions and more valid institutions compared with smaller and less 
valid institutions have more beauty fame and they ignore significant mistakes with 
less possibility. 
  An important issue regarding the definition of audit quality is whether to 
distinguish auditor quality from audit quality. Many studies do not make this 
distinction and even use the concepts interchangeably (e.g., Clarkson, 2000; Salehi, 
Mansouri, and Azary, 2009; Salehi, 2009 a; Salehi, 2009 b). Under certain 
conditions, auditor quality and audit quality might be used interchangeably. For 
instance, according to assumptions underlying DeAngelo’s (1981) audit quality 
definition, when an auditor provides only one level of quality of audit service, 
auditor quality and audit quality can be used interchangeably. However, as stated 
earlier, this assumption may be problematic. Anecdotal evidence suggests that all 
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auditor quality should be defined as the overall audit service quality of a certain 
audit firm. Meanwhile, as Lam and Chang (1994) have pointed out, audit quality 
should be defined on a service-by service basis because an audit firm may not 
conduct all its audits with the same level of quality. In other words, auditor quality 
is a firm-based concept and audit quality is a service-by-service based concept. 
Therefore, it is important to distinguish these two concepts based on the purposes 
of different studies (Salehi and Moradi, 2010; Salehi, 2010). The current study 
focuses on the concept of audit quality rather than auditor quality. Perceived audit 
quality and actual audit quality appear to be different concepts. 
  Although it is more important to investigate actual audit quality issues 
because the goal is to better understand actual audit quality, it is usually difficult to 
measure it directly. Actual audit quality is unobservable and can be evaluated only 
after audits have been conducted. For example, Palmrose (1988) measures actual 
audit quality using auditors’ litigation activities. Deis and Giroux (1992) analyze 
quality control reviews to get a measure of actual audit quality in the public sector. 
Krishnan and Schauer’s (2000) measure of actual audit quality is based on how 
audited financial statements comply with eight specific GAAP reporting 
requirements. Deis and Giroux (1992) and Krishnan and Sauer (2000) both 
measure actual audit quality in the not-for-profit sector. These two studies benefit 
from the availability of quality measures because of their context, but might suffer 
from generalization problems. 
 
  Review of related literature  
 
  Many studies test perceived audit quality due to the difficulty of measuring 
actual quality directly. DeAngelo (1981) analytically demonstrates that the larger 
the auditor, the less incentive the auditor has to behave opportunistically and the 
higher the perceived quality of the audit. Teoh and Wong (1993) test whether 
perceived audit quality is different between Big 8 and non-Big 8 accounting firms. 
  Moreland (1995) investigates how SEC enforcement actions against Big 
8/6 accounting firms affect their market perceived audit quality. Hogan (1997) 
documents that the perception of higher audit quality is associated with less 
underpricing in the IPO market. Balsam, Krishnan, and Young (2000) examine 
whether industry specialization increases market perceived audit quality. 
  Prior audit quality research has adopted a variety of measures for audit 
quality Pany et al., (1980) discussed the effects of gift discounts and client size on 
the perceived auditor independence. The objective of this study was to report the 
results of an empirical investigation of factors, which influenced the actual and/or 
perceived auditor independence. In the study, three independent variables were 
manipulated: (i) the purchase discount or gift, (ii) the size of purchase discount or 
gift, and (iii) the client size. Their report suggested that gifts and discount of even a 
minimal amount significantly affected the users' perceptions of auditor 
independence, but the effects of the client size were not significant. This study also 
highlighted that less confidence in the auditor independence was expressed for the 
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independent, as the respondents believed for each of the levels surveyed including 
‘No gift, $3, $40, and $125, the auditor was. 
  Lacy (1990) examined the effects of investment by the CPA partners and 
client principals on the perception of auditor independence. Specifically examined 
were the effects of a joint investment by a CPA partner and a client’s Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) in a limited partnership unrelated to the audit client, and a 
direct investment by a CPA in a client company. The results showed an 
inconsistency between the respondents’ perception of risk of losing the 
independence and the AICPA independence rules. The respondents were more 
concerned about the certain joint investments, which were acceptable under the 
AICPA rules, than they were about small percentage, financially immaterial direct 
investments which were unacceptable under the AICPA rules. The CPAs perceived 
that the risk of losing the independence when there was a direct ownership of stock 
by a CPA was greater than that of any other group who perceived the risk to be.  
  Firth (1980), in his survey, distributed 750 questionnaires and received   
369 completed questionnaires, the response rate being 52.00 per cent of the total. 
He examined 29 specific auditor-client relationships drawn from the ethical 
guidelines being proposed at the time. The participants were a random sample of 
chartered accountants (large-size firm of accountants working in other professional 
practices and those employed in commerce and industry), all major stockbrokers 
and investment managers (unit trusts, insurance companies, and merchant banks) in 
London and the loan officers of major banks and financial institutions. The 
provision of the NAS was ranked low as a threat factor for the three chartered 
accountant groups, but moderate for the other two user groups. The results showed 
that the lack of auditor independence was perceived to impair investment and 
lending decisions and this supported the ‘traditional’ view of the importance of 
auditor independence. It was also found that there were significant differences 
between the various groups of respondents regarding what constituted the 
independence and its importance.  
  Firth (1981) discussed the eight specific auditor-client relationships 
contained in the UK ethical guidelines of the time. He asked the bank lenders to 
make a loan decision based on the financial statements prepared in the context of 
one of these relationship situations. Two among the eight situations concerned the 
joint NAS provision: accounting services and consulting services. It was found that 
significantly lower loan responses were given than if there had been no joint 
service provision in both situations. Lindsay (1990) analyzed the impact of three 
contextual factors (audit firm size, competition, and NAS provision) on bankers’ 
perceptions of auditors and their ability to resist the management pressure. A 
repeated measure design was used. The NAS provision, while highly significant, 
explained only 1.00 per cent of the variance in bankers’ responses. This cast some 
doubt upon the practical significance of the joint provision on auditor 
independence perception.  
  Agacer and Doupnik (1991) made the first transnational study of auditor 
independence perceptions taking the US, Philippines and West Germany. Four    Volume 11, Issue 5, December 2010           Review of International Comparative Management  946 
variables were considered (the NAS provision and the members of the accounting 
profession). A full factorial, repeated measure design was used. It was found that 
significant differences existed between the three countries, with West German 
respondents indicating the greatest concern regarding the independence impairment 
and Philippine respondents indicating the least concern. These findings were 
explained in terms of cultural differences.  
  A survey was conducted by Abu Bakar et al., (2005) among 116 loan 
officers in Malaysia. The results showed that 75.60 per cent of the respondents 
indicated that the size of the audit firm did affect the auditor independence and 
74.40 per cent of them mentioned that the level of competition in the audit service 
market influenced the auditor independence. Furthermore, the results indicated that 
the provision of MAS had a negative effect on the auditor independence in 
Malaysia.  
  Contrary to the concerns that fee dependency impairs auditor independence, 
Reynolds and Francis (2002) found evidence consistent with the auditors 
increasing their independence in response to greater financial dependence. 
Specifically, they found that relatively larger audit clients- those on whom the 
auditor was expected to have the greatest financial dependence- tended to report 
significantly lower discretionary accruals when compared with smaller clients. The 
authors maintained that this was because the reputation and litigation damages 
from the audit failure were likely to be greater for the larger clients, providing 
incentives to the auditors to be more conservative. In addition, they also found no 
evidence that auditors were more lenient in issuing going concern reports to larger 
clients. Thus Reynolds and Francis found no evidence indicating that financial 
dependency impaired the auditor independence.  
  This study also showed that market-based institutional incentives such as 
reputation loss and litigation costs promoted auditor independence and outweighed 
the economic dependency created by higher fees. They felt that the essence of 
auditing was verification. Hence a rich model for auditing should contain 
something to verify. In the absence of verification, management received 
incentives to misrepresent the financial condition of the firm. These incentives 
arose because the financial reports were used to evaluate management’s 
performance, which was costly to observe directly. This study suggested that 
modeling auditing in a decision setting involved moral hazards, with agency theory 
providing a natural basis for the model. Agency theory models the contractual 
relationship between a principal and an agent, which in this case consists of the 
owner-principal and the manager-agent relationship. The authors assumed that the 
owner hires an auditor to produce information used in contracting with the 
manager. Thus the auditor was both an agent and a model as such.  
  Sajadi and Ebrahimimand (2005) elicited 98 Iranian Certified Public 
Accountants’ viewpoints on the factors increasing auditors’ independence. The 
objective of the study was to identify the factors which increased/would increase 
the auditors’ independence. The results showed that the factors such as audit 
committee, client size, the size and experience of audit firms increased the 
auditors’ independence, and other factors, namely, competition among the auditing 
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  A survey was carried out by Sajadi and Naseh (2003) in Iran regarding the 
effectiveness of certified auditing of financial statements among 51 managers. The 
conclusion was that independent auditors would be effective in the detection and 
reduction of illicit acts and offences as well as the exercise of precise appraisal of 
bases used in accounting estimates. 
  DeAngelo’s (1981) argument that size of audit firms is positively 
associated with audit quality, many studies uses size (Big 8/6/5 vs. non-Big 8/6/5) 
as the audit quality proxy (Krishnan, 2002). Many audit quality studies indicate 
that, when accounting firm size is used as the indicator of audit quality, higher 
audit quality is associated with less information asymmetry and higher information 
quality. For example, using discretionary accruals as the measure for earnings 
management, Becker et al. (1998) find that audit quality is negatively related to 
income-increasing discretionary accruals, which indicates that high audit quality is 
associated with low information asymmetry. Teoh and Wong (1993) find that Big 
8 clients are associated with higher earnings response coefficients (ERCs). The 
ERC is the coefficient on earnings resulting from regressing stock returns on 
reported earnings. It measures the extent to which the market responds to earnings. 
Results of performed studies by Carcello & Nagy (2004) indicate that being high 
auditor tenure, leads to increasing of auditor knowledge and specialty in industry 
of respective client. 
  In the other hand, more qualitative audit institutions can influence on 
management viewpoint applying to select account procedure and its incentives to 
manipulate on account accrual and also to perform profit management. Therefore, 
whatever amount of accounts such as receipt accounts, payment accounts and 
stocks (accounts corresponding to arbitrary accrual) is more; request for better 
monitoring and more qualitative audit will be increase. And generally an 
independent and skillful institution is able to identify incorrect presentation of 
account items and along with their modification and reporting reliable financial 
information be effective on its client. 
  To obtain this desired purpose is completely dependent on properties and 
condition of audit institutions' performance and these properties  and condition of 
audit institutions' performance can be correlated to audit quality positively or 
negatively (Chambers & Payne, 2008 b). 
  Sloan (1996) in his studies concluded if we calculate part of current profits 
of accrual upon one year later profits, it will have less constancy than that of cash 
incomes. He knows these resulting of difference in reliability of accrual and 
reported cash incomes; and believes that reported accrual is result of estimates and 
many adjustments which might be incorrect. So, accrual compared to cash incomes 
may primarily contain of error in measurement. Sloan attributes accrual to accrual 
with low reliability which this subject has supported by many further studies. 
  For instance, Xie (2001) divided total of accruals using Jones' model (1991) 
into two normal sector (non-arbitrary) and abnormal (arbitrary); and showed that 
abnormal accrual can contain deliberate and non-deliberate sophistications. 
  Also, he found that abnormal accrual mainly has lower stability. Pincus, 
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countries so that obtained results, in general show stability of lower accrual for 
abnormal accrual (Chambers & Payne, 2008 a). 
  Richardson et al., (2005) represented relation between accrual reliability 
and accrual stability formally by providing an analytical model of present errors. 
Such as how measurement error in accrual made to diagonal toward down in 
regression coefficient of cash incomes and accrual stability. This diagonal 
negatively is related to accrual reliability. 
  High accrual reliability leads to reduction of diagonal toward zero and 
subsequently, leads to accrual being high. In other words, low accrual reliability is 
equal to law accrual stability. 
  Dechow & Dichew (2002) provided other evidences and documents from 
relation accrual reliability and stability. They obtained a positive strong correlation 
between their measurements from accrual quality.  
Chambers & Payne (2008 b) in their study about audit quality and accrual 
capability concluded that being high audit quality and also using SOX Act result in 
increasing of accrual reliability. In other word, audit quality and using SOX Act 
have positive and significant relation with accrual reliability in financial lists of 
investigated firms. 
  Chambers and Payne (2008 a) in another study as term of audit quality and 
abnormal accrual concluded that the rate of operational efficiency related to 
abnormal accrual has negative relation with audit quality. In other words, low audit 
quality results in being higher abnormal accrual corresponding to operational 
efficiency. 
  Ferdinand  et al., (2009) in an study by title of effect of auditor tenure and 
specialty in  auditor industry on benefit quality concluded that when specialty in 
auditor industry is low, then relation between longer audit tenure and higher 
quality of profit will be strong and vice versa. 
  Lai (2009) in study by subject of whether is audit quality primarily 
significant for firms with investment opportunity? He concluded that firms with 
more investment opportunities rather than firms with less investment opportunity, 
by high probability use auditors of five large firms' member and have arbitrary. 
  Francis and Micheal (2005) in their study concluded that managers of 
companies having more accrual in order to ensure nonparticipation in opportunities 
of profit management intend to change employ qualified auditors and more likely 
auditors with larger size will be laid away from clients who intend to change 
accrual. 
 
 Research  methodology 
 
  The most important index of fame beauty of auditor is audit institution size. 
Larger and more valid audit institutions compared with smaller and less valid audit 
institutions guaranteed more fame beauty and less likely ignore significant 
mistakes or adventure of legal claim. In other hand, performing audit operations of 
client by an institution over prolonged years, because of audit team acquaintance 
with audit operations of client can be done more effectively. The role of auditor 
among other cases is safety evidence about reliability of financial reports. Finally, Review of International Comparative Management            Volume 11, Issue 5, December  2010  949 
an independent and skillful audit institution (with high audit quality) is able to 
identify incorrect representation of accounting and be effective on its client to 
correct those incorrect representations (Chambers & Payne, 2008 b). 
 
 Research  hypotheses 
 
  According to the above mentioned literature the following hypotheses were 
postulated in the study: 
  H1: Accrual reliability of audited firms with larger auditor size compared 
to audited firms with smaller size is more. 
  H2: Accrual reliability of audited firms with longer auditor tenure 
compared to audited firms with shorter tenure is more. 
  Statistical society of the study includes all listed companies on Tehran 
Stock Exchange (TSE). Due to expansion of statistical society value and presence 
of inconsistency among society members, following conditions are located to 
select statistical sample hence, statistical sample has selected in systematical 
elimination method. Mentioned conditions include: 
1  Financial year of firms leads to end of fiscal year. 
2  Firms which have been listed on TSE until end to 2004. 
3-  Firms which haven't had activity stop during 2005-2009 and haven't 
changed their financial period. 
4  Transaction of firms' stock has been performed constantly on TSE and 
transactional hasn't been occurred more than one month for mentioned 
stock.  
5  Required information of the study is accessible. 
6  Investment and brokers’ firms are laid away. 
  Regarding to mentioned situations, statistical sample includes 74 firms 
which are listed on TSE. Since every firm during 2005-2009 has seven set of 
financial information derivational in financial lists, so number of total observations 
of the firm is 518 cases. 
  In the other hand, because to calculate some variants, calculation of their 
changes required and also in Richardson model’s et al (2005) one- year- ahead 
earnings (at time t+1) are used, thus by selecting 2004 and 2009 as initial and end 
year, number of each firm observations has reached to 5 cases and total number of 
observations has reached to 370 cases. 
  To collect information about explaining literature of study subject, library 
method and documental studies and to obtain required information for processing 
research assumptions has utilized from present information in software firm and 
inspecting financial reports of listed companies on TSE by referring to formal site 
of Iran stock exchange. 
  In this phase after collecting data, in order to conclusion and required 
calculations Excel software has been used and obtained results from it, has inserted 
in SPSS, and have been finally analyzed to reach study objectives. The method of 
data investigation is sectional and year-by-year investigation.    Volume 11, Issue 5, December 2010           Review of International Comparative Management  950 
  Research method and related variables 
 
  Since this study attempts to find significant relation between two 
information groups in a society namely, audit quality and accrual reliability, so this 
study is situated among correlation studies. 
  In other hand, present study, is as kind of post-event, i.e. is accomplished 
based on analysis of past information (financial lists of firms). 
  In present study, first we test correlation between study variables and in the 
case of correlation existence between study variables, we will proceed to estimate 
regression model, so that audit quality be regarded as independent variable and 
accrual reliability be considered as dependent-variable. 
 
  Statistical models and test methods 
 
  In this study accrual stability has used to calculate accrual reliability by 
following Richardson et al., (2005) model which is as follow: 




 *+ ε t+1 
2) E
*
t+1= yC t+ y A t
 *+ ε t+1 
3) A=A*+e 
4) Et+1=ycCt+YA A t+ ω t+1 , ω t+1 = ε t+1+et+1 - yet 
Where: 
Et+1, is absolute profit before unexpected items that is identified in later 
period (time t+1). 
Et
*   is absolute profit before unexpected items at current period and y, is a 
coefficient which is ranging between 0 and 1 (0<y<1). 
ε t+1, is measurement error of absolute profit which is determined in next 
period (time t+1). 
Ct is cash incomes in current period (time t) and At, is accrual in current 
period (time t). A
* is real accrual which is specified in next period. i.e., 
is accrual measurement error and ω t+1 is sum of period measurement 
error. 
  To test each hypotheses of the study, two linear regression model has used 
as follow, so that once this regression model has estimated and used without 
interference of control variables (regression model No.1) once also this regression 
model has estimated and used with interference of control variables (regression 
model No.2). 




(Controlk*TACCt) ε t+1 
 Earningst+1: is equal to net profit before extraordinary items, which is 
standardized by dividing into average of total assets. 
 Total  accrual  (TACC): 
  Total accrual is calculated by following relation: 
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  In above relation, TACC is total of accrual, TA is total assets, CF is ash fee, 
TL is total of liabilities and PS is preferential stock which all cases be standardized 
by dividing into average of total assets. 
  (Cash Flows): cash flows are equal to profit minus total of accrual which is 
calculated by following relation: 
 CFit= Earningsit-TACCit 
   Control variables: (Controlk): In this study  based on Dechew & Dichev 
(2002) studies and findings, some particular properties of each firm such as 
operational cycle, absolute value of the change in sales, absolute value of the 
change in cash flows of commercial unit which can be effective on accrual stability 
and finally on accrual reliability can be used as operational variables. 
  Firms with longer operational cycle are indicating the most insecurity and 
the most use of estimates and approximates in accrual.  
  Firms which have most instability in their sale, the probability of having 
less stability in cash fee flows in them is more. 
  Upon the same reasons, firms which have most instability in cash fee flows; 
the possibility of having less stability in them is more. 
  It should be noted that calculation treatment of operational cycle, as one of 
the study control variables is as follow: 
 360/  (St/AARt) + 360/ [(CGSt)/ (AIt)] 
  Which in above relation, S is representation of firm sale, AAR is middle of 
received accounts, CGS is extinct cost of sold goods and AI is a sophisticated 
variable and AI is average of goods stock. 
  In regression models mentioned above, α1 coefficient measures stability of 
cash flows. HQ is an artificial variable that if audit quality is high, will be equal to 
0 and if audit quality is low (when auditor firms is not of audit organization or if 
auditor tenure is less than five years) will be equal to 1. 
  α2 is related to (HQ* TACC), measures stability of accrual for samples by 
higher quality. And α3 coefficient is related (LQ* TACC) which measures stability 
of accrual for samples with lower audit quality. 
  In this study, the hypotheses are tested by considering difference 
(comparison) between α2 and α3. So that if in estimated regressions, value of α2 
coefficient is larger than α3  coefficient value, the assumption of this study is 
accepted, otherwise will be denied which this test has performed for both 
assumptions of this study (Chambers and Payne, 2008 a). 
 Audit  quality: 
  To measure audit quality following variables are used:  
 Audit  Size: Such that in regression models No 1 & 2 if auditing institution 
is audit organization, artificial variable of 1 is used, otherwise number 0 is used. 
 Auditor  Tenure:  So that in regression methods no 1 & 2, if auditor tenure 
is 5 years or more, artificial variable of 1 is used, otherwise number 0 is used. 
 Study  findings: 
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  Tables 1 & 2, descriptive statistics and correlation between variables are 
shown. With reference to two tables one can realize that average of profit is more 
than average of cash flows and total of accrual, so this subject is indicating that 
most of the short term accrual is in positive form. 
 
Findings of descriptive statistics 
Table 1 














Average  0.226  -0.099  0.142  0.229  0.0327  279.85 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.309  0.331  0.286  0.264  0.0499  165.093 
First 
hundred 
-0.339  -1.255  -0.719  0.0008  0.00016  31.00 
First  
quarter  
0.073  -213  -.019  0.0501  0.0046  154.00 













Value of the 
change in 
cash flows 
Operational cycle  -0.255*  -0.105  0.118  -0.353**  -0.187 
Absolute Value of 
the change in cash 
flows 
-0.234*  -0.436**  0.334**  0.269*   
Absolute Value of 
the change in sales  -0.038  0.010  0.122     
Total of accrual  0.241*  -0.330**       
Cash flows  0.338**    
 
Significant in safety level 95%* 
Significant in safety level 99%   **  
 
  In regarding to Richardson model is observed that profit (One-year-ahead 
Earnings) is a dependent variable and cash flows are purposed along with total 
accrual as independent variable of this model; and because there is a significant 
correlation between cash flows variables and total of accrual with various profit 
(one-year-ahead Earnings), so dependent variables can some how predict 
independent variable. Also significant correlation between these two independent 
and dependent variables indicates that whatever cash flows and accrual is upward, 
firm profit also has a positive procedure. But significant negative correlation 
between accrual and cash flows indicates that whatever the firm have high cash 
flow, their accrual is also low and level of management point view applying for Review of International Comparative Management            Volume 11, Issue 5, December  2010  953 
manipulate on accrual be reduced and consequently, responsibility o accrual would 
be high. 
  Tables 3 and 4 show findings from test of first hypothesis; First hypothesis 
of this study has tested using of multi variable linear regression and based on 
Richardson et al., model’s (2005) by investigation of difference (comparison) 
between 
^a2  and ^a3. 
  Regarding to results from significant estimated regressions in Table 3) and 
also results of performed tests about significant estimated regression in Table 4) 
due to value of α2
^ mainly is more than α3
^, as a result fist assumption of this study 
is confirmed. 
  Also, accrual for samples with higher audit quality (larger size of auditor) 
compared with lower audit quality (smaller size of auditor) is primarily more. 
 
Findings from testing of first hypothesis (without applying control variables): 
 
  a) Significant test of regression coefficients:  
Table 3 
 
Findings from testing of first hypothesis (without applying control variables): 
 




  In Table 5 results from the study are provided once again after applying 
control variables. In respect to results from significant estimated regressions in 
Table 5,), and also results of performed tests about significant estimated regression 
coefficients in Table. 6), because value of 
^α2 is mainly more than ^α3, finally first 
hypothesis of the study again is confirmed.      
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Findings from fist hypothesis testing (by applying control variables): 
 




Findings from fist hypothesis: 
 
b) Result of first hypothesis 
Table 6 
     
Tables 7, 8 show findings from research second hypothesis testing. Second 
hypothesis of this research has been tested using multi variable linear regression 




  Regarding to results from estimated significant regressions in Table 7, and 
also results of performed tests about coefficients of estimated significant regression 
in Table. 8, because value of 
^α2 is more than 
^α3 (particularly in 2009), as a result 
second hypothesis of this research is confirmed. Thus, stability of accrual for 
samples with higher audit quality (longer auditor tenure) is more compared with 
stability of accrual for samples with lower audit quality (shorter auditor tenure). 
 
Findings from second assumption test (without applying control variables): 
   
a) Test of significant regression coefficients 
Table 7 
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  Findings from second hypothesis test: 
 




  In Table 9 findings from research after applying control variables are again 
purposed. Regarding to results from estimated significant regressions (in Table 9 
and also results of performed tests about estimated significant regression 
coefficients in Table 10), because value of ^a2 is primarily larger than ^a3, as a 
result, second hypothesis of the study is confirmed once again. 
 
Findings from second hypothesis testing (by applying control variables): 
 




Findings from Second hypothesis testing 
 






  As mentioned previously, Results of study assumptions' test show that 
value of accrual stability coefficient for higher audit is more than value of accrual 
audit coefficient for lower audit quality. These results are compatible to this 
thought that higher audit quality is related to higher accrual reliability. About 
confirming first assumption of this study, we can conclude that size of auditing    Volume 11, Issue 5, December 2010           Review of International Comparative Management  956 
institutions, history, and trade name of institutions are instances of indices 
distinguishing audit institutions, namely larger institutions and also institutions 
which have more popular trade names than other institutions have higher audit 
quality. 
  In other hand, more qualified audit institution results in increasing of 
accrual reliability. 
  It should be noted that results of first assumption test is according to 
findings of Chambers and Payne (2008 a), Kim Lai et al., (2009), Johl et al., (2007) 
Fallatah, (2006). 
  About confirm of second assumption of this study also can conclude that 
performing client audit operations by an institution during prolonged years, due to 
acquaintance of audit team with client audit operations  can be done effectively and 
leads to increasing of accrual reliability. 
  Also results of second assumption test of this study are compatible to 
results of Chambers and Payne 2008 a), Johnson et al., (2002), Purposes based 
upon study results: 
9  Regarding to obtained results from this study can expect that audit 
institutions with larger size (for example, auditing organization. Also we can offer 
to public communities' use of large audit institutions to audit their firm. Also we 
can suppose to stock exchange organization that in selecting valid and reliable 
audit institution more focus on firms which have larger size. But investors who are 
most important group of using financial lists also pay attention to auditors of firms, 
i.e. in their decisions for purchasing firms' stock concentrate on size of audit 
institutions which audit the firm. 
9  But an important point which can be purposed is that whatever auditor 
tenure is longer, can hazard auditor independency. Therefore, it is commended that 
auditors be selected by stockholders, irresponsible managers and members of audit 
committee so that relation between firm and auditor is made by a person who is not 
among responsible members in the firm, otherwise auditor independency may be 
inquietude. 
 
  Recommends for further studies: 
  Regarding to importance of the subject, it is commended to researchers that 
in further studies consider some subjects as follow: 
1  The investigation of the effect of audit quality on accrual reliability 
using other audit quality indices. 
2  The investigation of the effect of audit quality on accrual responsibility 
using Dechow and dichev. 
3 The investigation of relation between size of auditor and auditor 
independency. 
4 The investigation of relation between auditor tenure and auditor 
independency.  
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Limitations of study: 
  Along with accomplishing this study there also were limitations that we 
indicate some of them. Because of lack of necessary transparency about rate of 
audit fees, we couldn't utilize some criteria of measurement corresponding with 
auditors' fees (Such as specialty in auditor industry) and have investigated their 
influence on accrual reliability.  
  One of the other limitations, was lack of adjustment of financial lists' items 
by influenced on existence of inflation and having different times to establish for 
commercial units and eventually, to achieve firms assets' items in different times 
which results in reducing comparable quality of items and effects on study results 
and accompanies results generalization with some limitations. 
  Further, lack of controlling some efficient factors on study results such as 
effect of variables like economical factors, political conditions, firms’ life, kind of 
industry, condition of global economy, and regulations are out of reach of 




1.  Abu, Bakar, Nur, B., Abdul, R., Abdul, Rahman and Hafiz, M. Rashid (2005). 
“Factors Influencing Auditor Independence: Malaysian Loan Officers’ 
Perceptions”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 20, No. 8, pp. 804-822.  
2.  Agacer, Gilda M., and Timothy S., Doupnik (1991). Perceptions of Auditor 
Independence: A Cross-cultural Study, International Journal of Accounting, 
Vol. 26, pp.220-237.  
3.  Balsam, S., Krishnan, J. and Young, J. S. (2000). Auditor Industry 
Specialization and the Earnings Response Coefficient, Working Paper.  
4.  Barzegar, B, and Salehi, Mahdi (2008). “Re-emerging of Agency Problem: 
Evidences from Practicing Non-audit Services by Independent Auditors”, 
Journal of Audit Practice, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 55-66.  
5.  Becker, C. L., DeFond, M. L. Jiambalvo, J. and Subramanyam, K. R. (1998). 
“The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management”, Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 1-21.  
6.  Carcello, J. V., Nagy, A. L., (2004), “Client size, auditor specialization and 
fraudulent financial reporting”, Managerial Auditing Journal, 19, pp. 651-668.  
7.  Chambers, D., Payne, J., (2008), Audit Quality and Accrual Reliability: 
Evidence from the Pre-and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods, Working Paper, 
June, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn. com/abstract =1136787.  
8.  Chambers, D., Payne, J., (2008), Audit Quality and the Accrual Anomaly, 
Working Paper, May, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136787.  
9.  Clarkson, P. M. (2000). “Auditor Quality and the Accuracy of Management 
Earnings Forecasts”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 17, No. 4:   
595-622.  
10. Davidson, R. A. and Neu D. (1993). “A Note on Association Between Audit 
Firm Size and Audit Quality”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 9,  
No. 2, pp.  479- 488.     Volume 11, Issue 5, December 2010           Review of International Comparative Management  958 
11. De Angelo, Linda (1981). “Auditor Independence Low Balling, and 
Disclosures Regulation”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 3,   
pp. 113-127.  
12. DeAngelo, L. E. (1981). “Auditor Size and Audit Quality”, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 3, No. 3: 183-199.  
13. Dechow, P. and Dichev I., (2002), “The quality of accruals and earnings: the 
role of accruals in estimation error”, The Accounting Review, 77, pp. 35-59.  
14. Deis, D. R. and Giroux G. A (1992). “Determinants of Audit Quality in the 
Public Sector”, The Accounting Review. Vol. 67, No. 3: 462-479.  
15. Eilifsen, A. and W. F. Messier, Jr. (2000). “The Incidence and Detection of 
Misstatements: A Review and Integration of Archival Research”. Journal of 
Accounting Literature, Vol. 19: 1-43.  
16. Fallatah, Y., (2006), The Role of Asset Reliability and Auditor Quality in 
Equity Valuation: A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Florida Atlantic University.  
17. Ferdinand, A. Gul, Simon, Y, Jaggi, B., (2009), “Earnings quality: Some 
evidence on the role of auditor tenure and auditors’ industry expertise”, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 47, 265–287.  
18. Firth, Michael (1980). “Perceptions of Auditor Independence and Official 
Ethical Guidelines”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 55, No. 3, July, pp. 451-466.  
19. Firth, Michael (1981). “Auditor-Client Relationships and Their Impact on 
Bankers’ Perceived Lending Decisions”, Accounting and Business Research, 
Vol. 43, Summer, pp.179-188.  
20. Francis, J. and Micheal S., (2005), “A reexamination of the persistence   
of accruals and cash flows”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43, 
pp .413-451.   
21. Hogan, C. E. (1997). “Costs and Benefits of Audit Quality in the IPO Market: 
A Self- Selection Analysis”, The Accounting Review. Vol. 72, No. 1, pp. 67-86.  
22. Jensen, M. C. and. Meckling, W. H (1976). “Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”. Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 3: 305-360.  
23. Johl, S., Jubb, C. and Houghton, K., (2007), “Earnings management and the 
audit opinion: evidence from Malaysia”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 22, 
No 7, pp. 688-715.  
24. Krishnan, G. V. (2002). “Audit Quality and the Pricing of Discretionary 
Accruals”,  Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 22, No. 1,   
pp. 109-126.  
25. Krishnan, J. and Schauer P. C. (2000). “The Differentiation of Quality among 
Auditors: Evidence from the Not-for-Profit Sector”, Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice and Theory. Vol. 19, No.2: 9-26.  
26. Lacy, J.M., (1990). “Auditor/Client Joint Investment and Independence”, 
Research in Accounting regulation, Vol. 4, Fall.  
27. Lai, K., (2009), Does audit quality matter more for firms with high investment 
opportunities?, J. Account. Public Policy, 28, pp. 33–50.  Review of International Comparative Management            Volume 11, Issue 5, December  2010  959 
28. Lam, S. and. Chang S. (1994). “Auditor Service Quality and Auditor Size: 
Evidence from Initial Public Offerings in Singapore”, Journal of International 
Accounting Auditing and Taxation. Vol. 3, No. 1: p. 103.  
29. Lindsay, David H., (1990). An Investigation of the Impact of Contextual 
Factors on Canadian Bankers’ Perceptions of Auditors’ Ability to Resist 
Management Pressure, Advances in International Accounting, Vol. 3, 
pp. 71-85.  
30. Moreland, K. A. (1995). “Criticisms of Auditors and the Association between 
Earnings and Returns of Client Firms”, Auditing, Vol. 14, No. 1: 94-104.  
31. Palmrose, Z. (1988). “An Analysis of Auditor Litigation and Audit Service 
Quality”, The Accounting Review. Vol. 64, No.1: 55-73.  
32. Pany, Kurt and Philip M., Reckers (1980). “The Effect of Gifts, Discounts, and 
Clint Size on Perceived Auditor Independence”, The Accounting Review,  
Vol. LV, No. 1, January, pp. 50-61.  
33. Pincus, M., Rajgopal S., & Venkatachalam M., (2007), “The accrual anomaly: 
International Evidence”, Accounting Review, 82 (1), 169-203.  
34. Reynolds, Kenneth J., and Jere R., Francis (2002). Professional Service Fees 
and Auditor Objectivity, Working Paper, Louisiana State University.  
35. Richardson, Scott A., Richard G. Sloan, Mark T., (2005), "Soliman, and Item 
Tuna. Accrual reliability, earnings persistence and stock prices", Journal of 
Accounting & Economics, 39 (3), 437-485.  
36. Sajadi, Hossein and Ebrahimimand M (2005). “Factors Increasing Auditor’s 
Independence”, The Iranian Accounting and Auditing Review, Vol. 12, No. 40, 
pp. 61-80.  
37. Sajadi, Hossien and, Naseh L., (2003). “The Effectiveness of Certified 
Auditing of Financial Statements”, The Iranian Accounting and Auditing 
Review, Vol. 10, No. 33, pp. 65-91.  
38. Salehi, Mahdi (2007). “Reasonableness of Audit Expectation Gap: Possible 
Approach to Reducing”, Journal of Audit Practice, Vol. IV, No. 3, pp. 50-59.  
39. Salehi, Mahdi (2008). “Evolution of Accounting and Auditors in Iran”, Journal 
of Audit Practice, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 57-74.  
40. Salehi, Mahdi (2009 a). “In the Name of Independence: With Regard to 
Practicing Non-Audit Service”, International Journal of Business Research, 
Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 137-147.  
41. Salehi, Mahdi (2009 b). “Non-Audit Service and Audit Independence: 
Evidences from Iran”, International Journal of Business and Management,   
Vol. 4, No.2, pp. 142-152.  
42. Salehi, Mahdi (2010). “Evaluating Effectiveness of External Auditors’ Report: 
Empirical Evidence from Iran”, Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social 
Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 69-83. 
43. Salehi, Mahdi, and Abedini, Bizhan (2008). “Iranian Angle: Worth of Audit 
Report”, SCMS Journal of Indian Management, April- May, pp. 82-90.  
44. Salehi, Mahdi, and Azary, Zhila (2008). “Fraud Detection and Audit 
Expectation Gap: Empirical Evidence from Iranian Bankers”, International 
Journal of Business and Management, Vol. 3, No. 10, pp. 65-77.     Volume 11, Issue 5, December 2010           Review of International Comparative Management  960 
45. Salehi, Mahdi, and Moradi, M (2010). “Iranian Angle and Non-audit Services: 
Some Empirical Evidences”, Managing Global Transactions, Vol. 8, No. 2,  
pp. 3-25.   
46. Salehi, Mahdi, and Nanjegowda, K., (2006). “Audit Expectation Gap: the 
Concept”, Journal of Audit Practice, Vol.3, No. 4, pp. 69-73.  
47. Salehi, Mahdi, and Rostami, V (2009). “Audit Expectation Gap: Some 
International Evidence”, International Journal of Academic Research, Vol. 1, 
No. 1, pp. 140-146.  
48. Salehi, Mahdi, Mansouri, A, and Azary, Z (2009). “Audit Independence and 
Audit Expectation Gap: Empirical Evidence from Iran”, International Journal 
of Economic and Finance, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 165-174.  
49. Salehi, Mahdi, Mansoury, A, and Pirayesh, R (2008). “Factors Affecting 
Quality of Audit: Empirical Evidence of Iran”, Journal of Business Research, 
Vol. 2, No. 1&2, pp. 24-32.  
50. Sloan. R., (1996), “Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and 
cash flows future earnings?”, The Accounting Review, 71, pp. 289-315.  
51. Teoh, S. H. and Wong, T. J (1993). “Perceived Auditor Quality and the 
Earnings Response Coefficient”, The Accounting Review. Vol. 68, No. 2,   
pp. 346-366.  
52. Titman, S. and Trueman, B. (1986). “Information Quality and the Valuation  
of New Issues”. Journal of Accounting and Economics. Vol. 8, No. 2, 
pp. 159-172.  
53. Watts, R. L. and Zimmerman, J. L (1986). Positive Accounting Theory. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.  
54. Xie, Hong. (2001), “The Mispricing of abnormal accruals”, Accounting Review, 
76(3), 357-373. 